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Ohio's Physician-Patient Privilege in
Personal Injury Cases-Time for Reform
Mark O'Neill*
INTRODUCTION

In the literature of the physician-patient privilege the traditional
contributors have been the great law teachers.' It is time that the practitioners revealed how the privilege works m real life.
The public may not know it, and specialized sections of the bar may
not yet realize it, but there is a crisis m the adminimstration of justice m
civil jury cases. The physician-patient privilege lies dose to the heart
of that crisis, for it is woof and warp of 90 percent of those cases.
No longer can continued
existence of the privilege be
THE AUTHOR (A.B., Harvard College, LL.B.,
justified by familiar dich~s. It
Harvard University)
in Cleveland, Ohio.

is a practicang attorney

c a u s e s concealment of evidence, encourages dissembling,
promotes litigation, obstructs
settlement and contributes to court delay Fair analysis of its workings
demonstrates the need for its abrogation.
INCIDENCE OF THE PRIVILEGE
IN THE UNITED STATES

Ohio's privilege is established by Ohio Revised Code section 2317.02.
It provides:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
a physician, concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that

relation, or his advice to his patient.

2

There was no such privilege at common law; it is a statutory creature.' The first enactment in this country occurred in New York in
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of G. David Bluhm, a member of the
Ohio Bar, in preparation of this article.
1. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2380-91 (McNaughton rev. 1961); DE Wrrr, PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT (1958); Chafee, Privileged Commauncatwns: Is Justie Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witnejs
Stand, 52 YALE L. J. 607 (1943); DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician
and Patient, 10 W RES. L. REv. 488 (1959); DeWitt, Medical Ethics and the Law: The
Conflict Between Dual Allegiances, 5 W RES. L. REV. 5 (1953); Morgan, Suggested Remedy
for Obstructionsto Expert Testimony by Rules of Evuence, 10 U. CHI. L REV. 285 (1943).
2. OHio REV. CODE § 2317.02 (A).
3. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 2380.
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1828. At present, sixteen states5 continue to observe the common law
rule, as do England, Scotland, and most of the jurisdictions in the Commonwealth nations.' Thirty-four states have a physician-patient privilege
of one kind or another.7 Of these states, however, seven make it expressly inapplicable m personal injury cases.' In one state, it is modified
by a rule of procedure9 comparable to federal rule 35,1 in effect making
the privilege unavailable in personal injury situatons. In another the
court has discretion to declare the privilege inapplicable in the interests
of justice." In still another, the privilege is not available in cases which
are tried in courts of record. 2 In Louisiana it is available only in criminal
13
cases.
Accordingly, of the fifty states in the Union the physician-patient
privilege is applicable in full force in only twenty-three states in personal
injury cases which are tried in courts of record. Ohio presently belongs
to this minority.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE IN THE TRIAL OF
CIVIL CASES

The records of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County,
Ohio are probably illustrative of the experience of trial courts in metro4. Ibid.
5. Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and
Vermont.
6. DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physicin and Patient, 10 W REs. L REv.
488, 495 n.24 (1959).
7. ALASKA Comp. LAws § 58-6-6 (1949); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 12.2235 (1956);
ARx. STAT. ANN. § 28-607 (1962); CAL. CIrv. PROC CODE 5 1881; COLO.REV.STAT. ANN.
§ 153-1-7 (1954); HAwAII REv. LAWS § 222-20 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 9-203
(Supp. 1964); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (Supp. 1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714
(1946); IOWA CODE § 622.10 (1950); KAN. GEN. STATS. ANN. 5 60-2805 (1950); LA.
REV. STAT. 5 15-476 (1951); Mici. Comp. LAws § 27A.2157 (1962); MINN. STAT. §
595.02 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN.5 1697 (1957); MO.REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1952);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 5 93-701-4 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1206 (1956); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 48-080 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 20-1-12 (1954); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. 5 4504;
N.C.GEN. STAT. S 8-53 (1953); N.D.CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (1960); OmIo REV.CODE
§ 2317.02; OKLA. STAT. ut. 12 § 385 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1961); PA. STAT.
ANN. tt. 28, 5 328 (1958); S.D. CODE § 36.0101 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8
(1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-289.1 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (1956); W VA.
CODE ANN. § 4992 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 325.21 (Supp. 1964); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 1-139
(1959).
8. CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 1881; HAWAII REV. LAWS § 222-20 (1955); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 51, § 5.1 (Supp, 1963); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 48.080 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12
(1954); PA. STAT. ANN. it. 28, § 328 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-2891. (1957).
9. IOWAR. CIV. P. 133(b) (1951).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953).
12. Mohr v. Mohr, 119 WVa. 253, 193 S.F. 121 (1937); WVA. CODE ANN. § 4992

(1961).
13. LA. REv. STAT. § 15-476 (1951); Boulware v. Boulware, 153 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App.
1963).
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politan areas. In the January 1964 term of that court 2071 civil cases
were filed.'" Of these, 1137 were jury cases.'" Of these, fully 1045
or 92 percent were tort cases, and the overwhelming percentage of these
were suits for personal injuries.' 6
The court's records for the April, 1964 term establish the same pattern. During this term 3879 civil cases were filed, of which 2241 were
jury cases."' Of the jury cases, 2031, or 91 percent were tort cases.18
The number of these which were not for personal injuries was negligible.
These figures are astonishing. They establish that in Cuyahoga
County the principal business on the civil side of the common pleas court
is personal injury litigaton. This is not only in terms of sheer volume of
cases filed, but also in terms of the exhausting demands which this type
of litigation makes upon judicial time and manpower resources.' 9
If the principal business of the modern metropolitan trial court is
personal injury litigation, its principal business is the type of practice in
which the physician-patent privilege plays an inevitable and major role.
If the privilege were involved only rarely - as in will contests or suits
for life insurance proceeds - there would be no particular need to consider its practical impact. But when it is woof and warp of 90 percent
of the jury cases in our backlogged civil courts, it merits examination if
only to see whether its modification could have an ameliorating effect on
the serious social problem of jury case delay.
A TYPICAL BODILY INJURY CLAIM. ITS GENESIS,
DEVELOPMENT AND FINAL DISPOSAL

The influence of the privilege is felt long before a potentially litigable
matter ever gets near a courthouse. For purposes of illustration, assume
14. Records of John J. LaVelle, Court Administrator, Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The term
"civil cases" does not include divorce cases. It encompasses the following categories: automobile torts, other torts, contracts, appropriations, appeals from Industrial Commission, will
contests, partitions, foreclosures, Uniform Dependency Act cases and other equity cases.
15. The jury case segment of the civil cases filed encompasses the following categories:
automobile tort cases, other tort cases, appropriation cases, appeals from The Industrial Commission, and will contests. The non-jury grouping consists of the following categories: partiuons, foreclosures, Uniform Dependency Act cases, other equity cases, and contract cases. Most
contract cases are actions on cognovit notes; the remainder generally involve questions of contractual interpretation only, and if questions of fact are involved they are normally left to the
determination of the court as the trier of fact without the intervention of a jury.
16. Of the 1,045 tort cases, 662 were automobile tort actions and 383 were other tort actions.
17 Records of John J. LaVelle, Court Administrator.
18. In comparison to the 2,031 tort actions, the remainder of the jury cases consisted of 132
appropriation cases, 56 appeals from the Industrial Commission and 22 will contests.
19. The simplest personal injury case commonly takes 3 days to try, starting from the
time counsel are first summoned to chambers and ending with the rendition of the verdict.
A great many cases take 4, 5 or 6 days to try, and it is not uncommon for trials to last about
2 weeks. Probably the longest personal injury trial in the Cleveland area occurred several
v- -s ago; almost 3 months of trial were consumed in putting on the plaintiff's evidence
alone.
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a hypothetical but typical situation - one which the writer has observed
in all its essentials on hundreds of occasions.
An automobile is struck from the rear as it stands in a-line of traffic.
Police officers arrive at the scene and make a routine. investigation. They
ask if anyone wishes to go to a hospital. The gentleman who later becomes a claimant is mildly dazed and the back of his neck feels tight. He
tells the officers he would like to be checked at the hospital. They take
him there in their cruiser. At the hospital's emergency room he is
given an exammation by a young intern, X-rayed and advised to consult his family physician. On the following day he sees Ins family doctor.
The doctor takes a history, conducts a careful examination and notes his
findings in Is office record. He prescribes medication and suggests that
heat be applied to the neck, wich is now quite tender and stiff. He reassures his patient and tells him that he will be feeling better with the
passage of time.
Within a few days the tortfeasor's insurance adjuster is out to the
claimant'shouse. All insurance companies try to contact potential bodily
injury claimants as soon as possible after receiving notice of the accident.
Some companies are geared to making contact within three to four hours;
others may take a day or two. Companies served by independent adjusters instead of staff adjusters tend to take a little longer, since there is
more delay in the handling and forwarding of correspondence.
The purpose of the speedy. contact is to enable the company to get
to the claimant before a lawyer does. Doing so does not guarantee that
counsel will not ultimately represent the claimant, But it does give the
company a chance to demonstrate its-readiness to help, and if the ad,
juster impresses the claimant as a man who will do right by him, the
claimant -will be less inclined to employ the services of counsel.
The insurer's desire to avoid the involvement of counsel is a matter of,
simple economics. Matters in wlhch lawyers are involved cost more to
process and conclude than matters which -are-settled-directly with claimants.
I
The extent to which counsel are involved in the representation of
accident victims is substantially greater than is commonly assumed. Ten
to fifteen years ago counsel were involved in -a relatively small percentage of bodily injury claims. This percentage, in the experience of insurance claims personnel in the Cleveland area, has been increasing steadily. A representative sampling of claims superintendents in Cleveland
establishes that during the past year bodily injury claimants have been
represented by counsel in roughly 50 percent of all bodily injury files
disposed of prior to suit This figure varies from company to company,
ranging from a low of about 30 percent to a high-of about 70 percent.
The companies enjoying a good "direct settlement" experience are those
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whose procedures enable them to get to claimants quickly. The ones
which are not geared for making prompt contact are the ones which find
that counsel are most frequently in the picture.
The means by which counsel become involved are diverse. Sometimes the injured party has a personal attorney. Sometimes there is a
lawyer in the family. Sometimes counsel will be urged by a business associate or social friend. The organized bar has conducted an effective
public relations program which has unpressed the public with the benefit
of legal representation in a wide variety of situations. The public is also
inclined to associate the idea of counsel with personal injury problems.
Thus many lawyers become involved as representatives of bodily injury
claimants through no affirmative acts of their own. Some representation,
however, is due to affirmative action by counsel or their friends in the
field. Policemen, emergency room personnel, nurses, doctors, body shop
repairmen, and others whose work brings them into contact with accident
victims are often instrumental in transmittng news of an accident to members of the bar. Accident victims are often solicited by such persons, who
suggest the engagement of their favorite personal injury practitioner.
Solicitation by or in behalf of counsel is, of course, unethical; if proven
it guarantees disbarment. Nevertheless, it is a risk which is run by some
and is the cause, to an indeterminable degree, of the representation of
some portion of the claimant population.
If the claimant is one of the minority who is not represented by counsel, the adjuster will obtain a signed statement from him which describes
the accident and the injuries which he sustained. The adjuster will also
obtain authorization from the claimant to get a copy of his hospital record, and he will leave forms for the claimant's doctor to fill out describing the injuries. In this way the adjuster informs himself of the medical
aspects of the claim.
If counsel represents the claimant, however, the situation is quite different. The adjuster must now deal with counsel, and all of his requests
for medical information must be directed to counsel. At this point the
physician-patient privilege begins to take effect.
If counsel desires, he can keep the hospital records secret. They are
privileged. He can keep his own medical reports secret. They are privileged. He can forestall the claimant's doctors from making any report
to the adjuster. The doctors' findings are privileged. And he has the
right to make the claimant totally unavailable for defense medical examination.
During the period in which counsel and the adjuster are in contact
with each other the claimant's medical treatment continues. Our typical
accident victun makes periodic office visits to his family doctor for a
month or two. He may be hospitalized for traction. He may be ordered
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to take physiotherapy treatments as an outpatient at one of the hospitals

or in a physiotherapist's office. All of the reports to counsel and the
business records of treatment rendered are privileged against disclosure.
The adjuster is given none of this material unless it suits claimant's
counsel.
The entrance of counsel into the picture frequently has an effect on
the course of medical treatment. Counsel may be content to have his
client continue with the family doctor. Frequently, however, he decides
that it would be advisable for a consultant or a new treating physician to
enter the picture. Typically this doctor enjoys a favorable relationship
with counsel. From past experience in similar situations he has become
appreciative of counsel's problems, and he likes to be of help.
The doctor to whom the patient has been referred by counsel is usually a man of outstanding qualifications. Commonly, he has been certified
by a specialty board. If he should- ever testify in court, he will look impressive, he will sound impressive, he will be impressive. In the great
majority of instances he adheres strictly to his personal standards of professionalism. But by dint of his background, experience and personal
predilection he has an underlying attitude. This fundamental attitude is
hardly ever out of phase with the objectives of the attorney who referred
the claimant to him.
The consultant typically makes one or two examinations of the
claimant. His first examination is some months after the accident occurred. He submits a careful report to counsel, describing in detail the
history, the complaints, the physical findings, and the prognosis. The description of the accident is frequently vivid. Commonly there are objective findings of present disability. Prognosis is hardly ever cheerful.
Normally it is "guarded." Sometimes the consultant will submit a report which is tacitly understood to be for settlement purposes only. There
is an understanding that if the doctor were under oath and Ins testimony
were being transcribed, it probably would not climb to the favorable
heights indicated in the report. The lily is gilded somewhat as an aid to
favorable negotiation.
The adjuster in the meantime has been asking counsel how the claimant is getting along. Counsel usually replies that he does not yet have all
of his special damages and doctors' reports together. Frequently this is
true. Counsel has asked the family doctor for a report, but his requests
have been ignored. The family doctor wants to avoid medicolegal situations. He considers report-writing for lawyers a nuisance and a bore, and
he justifies his diffidence on the ground that it is more important for him
to be saving people's lives.
After months go by and the adjuster is still without any medical information, he asks if the claimant could be examined by a doctor of his
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designation. Claimant's counsel find it convenient to withhold permission for such an examination right away, pleading inconvenience, the
press of business, his temporary inability to accompany the client to the
doctor's office, and so on. Throughout this period, however, the adjuster
and counsel attempt to discuss settlement. In many cases it is the objective of counsel to keep the adjuster in the dark about those aspects of
the medical picture which are not advantageous to the claim. Negotiation is undertaken in an atmosphere of sales puffing, exaggeration, nondisclosure of selected items, and bluffing. Nevertheless, if the parties
can strike a rough practical balance on a figure which can be justified to
their principals, the matter will be settled. This occurs about 75 per cent
of the time. All too frequently, however, settlements are not the result
of informed discussion; the claim is simply sold by counsel and bought
by the adjuster. If the latter does not operate in total darkness, at least
he has been forced to perform in areas of heavy shade.
As noted, only about 75 per cent of the claims in which counsel
are involved are settled without suit. The remaining 25 per cent advance
to the litigation stage. There are many reasons why bodily injury claims
get into litigation. Not the least of these is the existence of reasonable
differences of opinion about value even after all facts are known to both
sides. However, a fundamental institutional cause is the cloak of secrecy
which the law encourages counsel to draw around the very core
of his case: its medical features. So long as counsel are encouraged by
the existence of the medical privilege to conceal from the insurer available medical opinion, the insurer will be leery of parting with its money
Without objective data in his file, an adjuster is generally unable to justify
to his superiors the payment of anything more than very modest and
therefore very safe sums in which claimant's counsel is not likely to display much interest. Where medical data is not disclosed, settlement
negotiations become form without substance. Discussions cannot be
conducted sensibly; there is apparent puffing on the one hand and fearful
intransigence on the other.
Once the claim advances to the suit stage - but not until then - the
defendant has the right to a medical examination of the plaintiff.2" By
the time this examination is actually conducted, however, a couple of
years have usually elapsed since the accident occurred. By this time many
plaintiffs have no objective signs of injury. All that the defense doctor
can report is that notwithstanding subjective complaints, there was no
objective evidence of disability at the time of his clinical examination.
20. The defendant's right to an examination stems from the right of the court in which an
action is pending to make equitable orders in the interests of justice without statutory authority. See S.S. Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N.E. 611 (1931); Miami & Mont-

gomery Turnpike Co. v. Bailey, 37 Ohio St. 104 (1881); Nomina v. Eggeman, 188 N.E.2d
440 (Ohio C.P. 1963)
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When the essence of his report is communicated to plaintiff's counsel,
the latter's rejoinder is likely to be one or both of the following:
"Aw, that defense-minded doctor never finds anything anyway." Or "He didn't see my man until two years after the accident. I've got
reports from the treating physicians and they all report plenty of objective signs."
Under the present practice the report which defense counsel receives
from the defense doctor is privileged. 2 ' Plaintiff's counsel has no right
to see it. Nor can plaintiff's counsel depose the defendant's doctor.2
Similarly, the defendant cannot obtain the reports of plaintiff's doctors to
plaintiff's counsel. They are privileged. Plaintiff's doctors cannot be
deposed by defense counsel; they are incompetent to testify by virtue of
the privilege. And defense counsel have no right to see the portion of the
plaintiff's hospital record which reflects privileged communications between the plaintiff and his doctors.23 Thus, since each side has the right
to keep all its medical data secret, settlement discussions can and often
do occur in an atmosphere of mutual ignorance and unreality.
Since lawyers are generally practical people who are interested in a
practical disposal of their cases, they are usually driven by force of circumstances toward a partial disclosure of the medical data in their hands
if settlement negotiations are to be productive. As a practical matter, accordingly, the privilege of secrecy which the law confers is, to varying
degrees, disregarded. When it is to their advantage counsel will disclose
a portion of the medical cards which the law encourages them to hold so
closely to their vests. If the privilege were rigidly observed in practice,
parties could hardly ever settle their cases. They would have to try almost every case to learn enough about the medical evidence to reach a
judgment about its settlement value. No one can try every case, and no
no one wants to try every case. What occurs therefore is a degree of voluntary communication which gives counsel some understanding of the
available medical evidence.
The disregard of the privilege for practical purposes is hardly ever
complete. The exchange of medical information is usually on a piecemeal basis, each side displaying its strongest cards only. As a result, while
there is some degree of voluntary disclosure, it proceeds on an ad hoc basis
from case to case. The objective is generally the maximizatAon of personal advantage.
If the matter cannot be settled, it must of course proceed to trial. At
this stage the plaintiff invariably testifies about his injuries and his medical
treatment, thus waiving the privilege. His doctors testify about what
21.
22.
23.

In re Bates, 167 Ohio St. 46, 146 N.E.2d 306 (1957).
Ibid.
See Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
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they found, and defense counsel thus learn of their opinions. Similarly,
the defendant's doctor testifies as to his findings and opinions, and this
is commonly the first time that plaintiff's counsel has learned of them.
Complete disclosure is thus ultimately effected.
After all is said and done and after the passage of many years, the
secrecy privileges enjoyed by the parties vanish through the process of
express waiver. And it is ironic that waiver must be made in every personal injury case, for if it were not the very core of the case, the injury
component, could not be proved. Since the secrecy rights conferred by
the privilege are always relinquished in the last analysis, the question
naturally arises: Was it necessary that they should exist in the first place?
AN EVALUATION OF THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION
OF THE PRIVILEGE

The primary theoretical function of the privilege is to encourage patients to make that complete disclosure to their doctors which they would
not make unless their doctors' lips were sealed in court. The theory is
that if doctors were not restrained from testifying about what they learn
in the privacy of their offices, patients would not make full disclosure to
them out of fear of being embarrassed in court, and this in turn would
make it difficult for doctors to treat medical problems effectively.'
It is questionable whether this notion has any validity Lawyers of the
greatest eminence have challenged both its logic and the social benefit
claimed for it.25
The theory assumes, of course, that patients know about the testimonial privilege before they consult their doctors and that because they
know of it they speak more freely. Yet not one patient in a thousand
knows of it. If patients are ignorant of it, it obviously has no effect on
the degree to which they confide.
A patient who seeks medical treatment wants the best for himself
and will do everything he can to help his doctor provide it. He will
answer every question his doctor asks, whether or not he knows of the
privilege. The possibility that some day his doctor may have to make
disclosure in court is so remote that it is never considered, except perhaps
where the patient has a court proceeding pending in which his condition
is in issue. In that event he will probably offer his doctor's testimony
anyway.
Generally speaking, it cannot be contended with reason that patients
24. 8 WIGMORE, op. ci. supra note 1, at § 2380a; 56 OHIO JuR. 2d IVitnesses § 240; see
DeWitt, supra note 6, at 493.
25. 8 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 2380a; Chafee, supra note 1; DeWitt, supra note
6, at 494-500.
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would fear the consequences of court disclosure if the testimonial privilege were removed. If there is any fear about disclosure of an embarrassing condition, it is that the doctor might make indiscreet comment on a
purely private level to a person within the patient's circle of acquaintances, and this is a risk which the testimonial privilege neither reaches nor
guards against.
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that of the many ailments which
affect the human constitution only a few give cause for embarrassment.
People openly recount to their friends all manner of details about their
operations, skiing injuries, coronaries, and the like. That people talk
about such things routinely and voluntarily strongly suggests that they
would feel no embarrassment if a court were informed of them by the
person best qualified to describe the condition - the treating doctor.
The claim that the testimonial privilege enhances medical management simply cannot be supported. The privilege does not exist in such
centers of medical science as Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, San
Francisco and Los Angeles. But no one has yet suggested, or much less
demonstrated, that the practice of the medical art has suffered there in
comparison to places like Cleveland, Columbus, Toledo, and Cincinnati,
where the privilege does exist.
Whatever validity there may be to the theoretical justification of the
privilege, and this is to be doubted, it has absolutely no validity in the
personal injury action. Such an action comes into being when the pa.
tient has his lawyer prepare a petition for filing with a court which broadcasts in public record all of the physical, mental, and emotional conditions which the patient has related to his doctor. Once these complaints
and conditions are voluntarily made a matter of public record, there is
no longer any rational basis for the testimonial privilege. Logically
it should be deemed waived when the petition is filed. In this situation
enforcement of the privilege makes no sense. Its lack of logic is bad
enough; worse, however, is the mischief to which it can be put as an
affirmative instrument of injustice. As Professor DeWitt has observed:
When a party voluntarily puts in issue his state of health or his bodily

injury and discloses the details thereof to serve his own pecuniary
ends, any good and sufficient reason for maintaining the silence of the
physician no longer obtains. A patient may keep the door of the sickroom dosed, but he should not be permitted to open it so as to give an
imperfect or false view of what took place there, and promptly shut the
door the minute the truth is about to be revealed. It is a monstrous
thing to permit a party to fabricate evidence for himself in this class of
cases, and then deny his adversary the right to resort to the only reliable means to elicit the truth.26
26. DeWitt, supra note 6, at 499.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE PRIVILEGE IN LIGHT OF
PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

Pre-trial discovery of relevant evidence is afforded by a wide range
of statutes and judicially declared rules. Deposition procedure is authorized by Olo Revised Code sections 2319.06 through 2319.19,2T under
which parties may take each other's depositions and the depositions of
all those having knowledge of matters relating to the issues.
Under sections 230943 and 2317.0728 parties may propound written interrogatories to each other. Under the latter statute a complete
cross examination may be conducted in writing, and it may go even to
the point of determining the names of witnesses who were with a party
at the time of his accident.29
Production of books, records and written instruments is authorized
under sections 2317.32, 2317.33 and 2317.35.30 These sections compel
which contain evidence perthe production of "books and writings
which contain evidence
tinent to the issue," "books and documents
relating to the merits of the action," and "written instruments" on which
one's claim or defense is founded. Under these provisions, for example,
a party can be ordered to produce copies of his income tax records to
shed light on the question of whether his accident actually caused an
income loss.3
Under section 2317 4832 chattels are subject to inspection and testing.'

Substantial discovery of medical matters is authorized under the federal practice. Under federal rule 353" the defendant has a right to a
medical examination of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has the right to a
copy of the defendant's doctor's report. He may also depose the defendant's doctor. Defense counsel have the right to copies of reports
prepared by plaintiff's doctors, and they may depose the plaintiff's
doctors.
Only in the state practice, by virtue of the physician-patient privilege,
does discovery skid to a screeching halt when it approaches the medical
core of a personal injury case.
The sound soaal policies underlying the expansion of discovery in
non-medical areas are surely applicable with equal force to the discovery
OHIO REv. CODE §5 2319.06-.19.
28. OHIo'REv. CODE § 2309.43, 2317.07
29. Furman v. Central Park Plaza Corp., 102 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio C.P. 1951)
30. OHio REV. CODE § 2317.32, .33, .35.
31. Mandell v. Yellow Cab Co., 170 N.E.2d 296 (Ohio C.P. 1958)
32. OmIo REV. CODE § 2317.48.
33. See Levm v. Cleveland Welding Co., 118 Ohio App. 389, 187 N.E.2d 187 (1963);
Driver v. F.W Woolworth Co., 58 Ohio App. 299, 16 N.E.2d 548 (1938); Lawson v. Hudepohl Brewing Co., 101 N.E.2d 254 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
34. FED. R. Civ.P.35.
27
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of medical facts in personal injury actions. As one court recently observed:
The trial of a lawsuit is not a game to be conducted by -two adversaries,
but it is a matter in which the general public has an mterest; for such
suit concerns the settlement of controversies, which leads to peace and
tranquility in the state. To that end any reasonable order for the
inspection of property alleged to be involved in a claim of bodily harm
can lead but to revealing the truth of the conflicting claims, which is
what an action at law seeks to determine.35
The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas has held:
It would seem that the courts have moved away from the old theory that
a lawsuit is a game of wits and that secrecy must surround a party's
case until the day of trial
In the federal courts the federal rules of
civil procedure have recognized the need of getting at the truth of controversies at an early stage with a view to clearing the issues and eliminating surprise. It is logical that state courts should arrive at the same
36
result. After all, a lawsuit is a quest for truth
In the same vein, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas has
held that interrogatory procedure
was intended
to permit either side
acquainted -with the facts
prior to the
vent the trial of a lawsuit from being a
and ingenuity
and to attempt instead to
7
justice.

in a lawsuit to become fully
trial of the case, and thus pregame or mere contest of wits
make it a true instrument of

Surely the healthy policies underlying the expansion of pre-trial discovery are applicable to the medical factor in personal injury cases. In
so many of these cases the very heart of the matter is medical. Unless
the medical core of the case is as open to discovery as all other factors,
counsel will continue playing games with each other.
The bar has a duty to itself and to the public to make it clear that in
this area of the law we are not playing games.

A personal injury law-

suit can no longer be regarded as a contest for lawyers in which the most
agile man wins. The objective of a lawsuit is the attainment of a just
result. In the personal injury field it is time that the bar put justice
ahead of winning.
CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLITION OF THE
PRIVILEGE IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
The fundamental consequence of an abolition of the privilege in personal injury cases would be to bring to that practice a quality of openness and candor which is now so sadly lacking. The existing system
encourages concealment. What results is sleight of hand, misrepresenta35.
36.
37.

Levm v. Cleveland Welding Co., 118 Ohio App. 389, 393, 187 N.E.2d 187 (1963.).
Furman v. Central Park Plaza Corp., 102 N.E,2d 622, 625 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
Dieckbrader v. New York Cent. RR, 113 N.E.2d 268, 280 (Ohio C.P. 1953)
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non, bluffing, and other forms of questionable conduct. If the smoke
screen were swept away, however, and all cards were dealt face up on
the table, settlement discussions could proceed with a degree of rationality
and objectivity which is only rarely attained now
It cannot be proven in advance, but it seems fair to assume that
abolition of the privilege would enhance the possibilities of settlement
at every stage in the life of a bodily injury claim. With respect to those
claims which are still in the pre-litigation stage, abolition of the privilege
plus the enactment of supplementary discovery statutes would have a
"filter down" effect which would greatly increase the extent of voluntary
disclosure. If the parties understand that they will be forced to make
complete disclosure to each other once the claim goes to suit, they will
be inclined to make a voluntary disclosure of those matters prior to suit
which they would be compelled to disclose following suit. The "filter
down" effect would unquestionably increase the opportunities for sensible settlement discussions in the pre-litigation stage and would tend to
reduce the volume of suit filings.
Of those claims that go to suit, it could reasonably be expected that
full disclosure by both sides of all available medical data would increase
both the volume and the rate of disposals prior to trial. Of those dains
which do proceed to suit, of course, only a tiny fraction go all the way to
verdicts. On the average, about 90 of every 100 personal injury suits
are settled during the pre-trial stage."8 The burden of disposal is thus
actually carried not by the courts but by counsel and insurance claims
representatives. Anything that might reasonably be done to amplify
the opportunities for settlement should be encouraged. While abolition
of the medical privilege in personal injury cases is certainly no cure-all,
its fundamental momentum would be in the direction of promoting sensible discussions and settlement agreements. And to that extent it would
ameliorate congestion on the civil jury docket to some undetermined
degree.
Would the vital routines of physicians be disrupted if they were
subject to discovery depositions? This is most doubtful. Most doctors
would probably finish out their lives without once having to testify on
a deposition. The expense factor alone would mitigate against
medical depositions. The fair fee of the doctor should reasonably be
assumed by the party taking his deposition. This could be expected to
38.

Lloyd Lustig, Assignment Commissioner of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga

County, advised that this is the experience of that court.

The author knows of no national

studies or statistics, but his discussions of the subject with lawyers from different parts of the
country indicate that the 90 percent figure is generally true nationwide. Statistical studies
compiled by the author's firm with respect to its own experience establish that of more than
3000 suits disposed of in a ten year period through 1963 inclusive, 90 percent were disposed
of prior to verdict, and 84 percent were disposed of prior to impaneling of the jury.
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run about $100 plus. Counsel's time would have to be paid for, and
the not inconsequential charges of the court reporter would have to be
incurred. Thus, the ultimate cost to an insurer who wants to depose a
plaintiff's doctor would be on the order of $200 or more. This kind of
expense is not lightly incurred. And it certainly would not be incurred
routinely. Doctors' depositions would probably be taken only in unusual
stituations.
In the estimation of counsel for the American Medical Association,
doctors should not resist the abrogation of physician-patient privilege
statutes if adequate safeguards are provided against the potentials of

abuse. 9
Abolition of the privilege in personal injury situations would have
two specific technical consequences: (1) it would enable the defendant
to depose the plaintiff's treating physicians; and (2) it would enable the
defendant to obtain those portions of hospital records which contain
matters now privileged under the statute. If the ends of justice were
truly to be served, abolition of the privilege should be accompanied by
the enactment of supplementary discovery statutes which would open up
to both sides all areas of the medical field. Such statutes should provide
specifically for the following objectives.
(1)
(2)

(3)

The reports which plaintiff's counsel receive from treating physicians should be subject to discovery by defense counsel 40
The consulting physicians to whom counsel send plaintiffs for the
purposes of trial preparation should likewise be subject to discovery depositions, and their reports to plaintiff's counsel should
be discoverable by defendants.4 '
The defendant's doctor should be subject to deposition by plaintiffs counsel, and the reports which he4 2submits to defense counsel should be discoverable by plaintiffs.

39. Zenoff, Confldential and Prwileged Commaunwcamons, 182 A.M.AJ. 656 (1962).
40. As a matter of strict logic the patient's waiver of the physician-patient privilege would
not operate as a waiver of his attorney's work-product privilege, and the latter privilege might
well be regarded as the one which shields from defense counsel's eyes the reports which plaintiffs counsel receives from the examining physicians. Special provision for discovery of such
reports should be made. Additionally, it would be advisable to provide for the discovery of
these reports to minimize the incidence of depositions of treating physicians. In most cases
defense counsel and their clients would probably desire to forego deposing treating physicians
if they had a copy of his report which sets out his findings, diagnosis, prognosis, and description of treatment.
41. Insofar as the attorney's work-product privilege is concerned, there may be a recognizable distinction between treating physicians who treat the patient prior to the involvement of
counsel and consulting physicians to whom the patient is sent by counsel for the purpose of
preparing the case for trial. As to the consultants, it could be contended that their reports
fall within the attorney s work-product privilege and are therefore not affected by the patient's
waiver of the statutory privilege relating to communications between patient and treating
physician. This is a matter which should be covered by express reference in supplementary
discovery rules if the statutory privilege were abrogated in personal injury situations.
42. Under Ohio law, the defendant's doctor may not be deposed by plaintiff's counsel and
his report to defense counsel is privileged against disclosure. In re Bates, 167 Ohio St. 46,
146 N.2d 306 (1957). While the supreme court has not defined the exact nature of that
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Plaintiffs' counsel may react adversely to the idea that their consultant's reports should be discoverable by the defense; and defense
representatives may bristle at the thought of losing the secrecy privilege
which presently surrounds defense medical reports under state but not
federal practice. Discovery, however, is not a one-way street; traffic
should move both ways. And every vestige of the shrouds of secrecy
which veil the existing practice should be swept away in the interests of
justice and rational settlement discussion. Accordingly, we commend
to the good graces of all those concerned with the effective administration
of justice in the personal injury field the following draft of a bill to
amend the physician-patient privilege statute in Ohio and to provide for
supplementary rules of discovery
A

BILL TO ABROGATE THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES AND TO PROVIDE FOR
SUPPLEMENTARY DISCOVERY PROCEDURES THEREIN

(A)
The commencement of an action to recover damages for personal injuries or wrongful death shall constitute consent by the person
bringing the action that any physician who has examined, treated, consulted or prescribed with respect to the injured person or decedent is free
to testify in the trial of the action and in any deposition instituted by
any of the parties thereto respecting his knowledge of matters and his
treatment of conditions which are relevant to the physical, mental and
emotional conditions for which damages are sought.
(B)
In any such action, no portion of a hospital record otherwise
admissible into evidence shall be deemed inadmissible or privileged
against discovery by virtue of Revised Code section 2317.02 (A)
(C)
In any action contemplated by this section the court in which
the action is pending shall, upon the motion of any party, order such
mental or physical examinations by physicians as the court deems just.
The court shall determine the time, place, manner, conditions and scope
of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
(D) In any action contemplated by this section, counsel in possession of reports from physicians concerning their examination, consultation, treatment or prescription regarding the person whose physical or
mental condition is in issue shall deliver copies of such reports to counsel
for all other parties to the action within a reasonable time after request
is made therefore. If delivery of such reports is not made pursuant to
privilege, it would appear to be generally of the attorney's work-product type. Logically,
statutory abrogation of the physician-patient privilege would not reach the work-product
privileges now enjoyed by defense counsel. In order to insure that defense counsel would be
obligated to reveal all of their medical data, just as plaintiff's counsel would be obligated to
do there would have to be supplementary legislation which would bring this result about.
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such request, the court in which the action is pending shall order delivery
to be made, and it shall, in its discretion, make such further orders as are
reasonable and appropriate.
(E) In any action contemplated by this section, each party shall
have the right to depose physicians who have examined, treated, consulted
or prescribed with respect to the party whose mental or physical condition
is in issue. The reasonable fee of the medical witnets shall be paid by
the party instituting the deposition. The court in which the action -is
pending shall have jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the fee
charged by the medical -witness. In so doing the court may inform itself
of the fees customarily charged in the community by other physicians of
comparable learning, taking into account the time involved in preparing
for and giving testimony.
(F) Effect shall not be denied to any of the provisi6is of this
section on the ground that the person whose mental or physical condition
is in issue is a minor.
(G) In all proceedings pursuant to the"provisions of .hls section,
the court in which the action is pending shall have jurisdiction to make
all such orders as in its discretion may be required, uponthe, motion of
any party or witness, to safeguard parties and witnesses from oppression,
embarrassment, harassment or other injustice.

